Insights from US Trade Surveillance
Miles Kellerman, (DPhil International Relations), holder of an Oxford-Radcliffe Scholarship, has recently authored an article in the peer-reviewed journal, Regulation & Governance, titled, “Market Structure and Disempowering Regulatory Intermediaries: Insights from US Trade Surveillance.”
Miles’ article examines the politics of outsourcing regulatory tasks to private firms. He focuses on situations in which public agencies seek to reverse these outsourcing arrangement by disempowering their regulatory intermediaries. The article contends that the success of such disempowerment attempts depends on market structure, i.e. the level of competition between regulatory intermediaries. To test this hypothesis, the article examines two case studies on the US Securities and Exchange Commission’s efforts to develop independent surveillance capabilities in the 1980s and 2010s.
Miles Kellerman is in his final year of his DPhil, titled, “Surveillance Games: The International Political Economy of Combatting Transnational Market Abuse. Miles previously worked at a London-based consultancy specialising in regulatory advice and financial crime investigations. He has an MPhil in International Relations from St. John’s College, Oxford, and a BA in Political Science from the University of Wisconsin-Madison.